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Jeffcoat: Evidence

EVIDENCE
I. FORMAL ASPECTS
A.

Technicalities Devoid of Discernable Merit
Another shortcoming is over-emplmsis on the technique of legal rules
in detail, with corresponding under-emphasis on policies, reasons, and
principles. This is a difficult thing to describe to those who do not
sense it without description; but it is very marked. It is the kind of
thing that is like the dead bark on the outside of a tree, in contrast to
the living, growing inner core. Too much of our law is dead bark ....
The treatment tends to become mechanical. Reasons are lost from
sight.'

1.

Unintentional Waiver of Objection by Cross-Examination

In State v. Hoffman,2 the defendant appealed his conviction under the state's Blue Light Law. 3 In separate action, the
town of St. Matthews had charged Hoffman with driving too
fast for conditions and creating excessive noise. Hoffman was
acquitted of those offenses in the Municipal Court of the Town
of St. Matthews. 4 At trial on the charge of failure to stop on
a patrolman's signal, the prosecutor presented St. Matthews
Police Officer Collin Haynes whose signal Hoffman had allegedly disregarded. Haynes testified that he used his signal
devices to stop Hoffman because he had observed the defendant and others driving too fast and making excessive
noise. 5 Defense counsel promptly objected to such testimony.
Just as promptly the judge replied: "This is merely background and I overrule the objection."' 6 While cross-examining
Haynes the defense counsel apparently attempted to prove
that Hoffman and his companions could not have been speeding. This examination proved unproductive except to constitute a waiver of the original objection. Defense counsel
had not uttered the required phrase to indicate that he still
objected to the admission of testimony concerning other
offenses.
1. I WiGomRE, EvIDENCE §8a (3d ed. 1940).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
S.C. ConE ANN. §46-359 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
257 S.C. at 465, 186 S.E2d at 423.
Id. at 467, 186 S.E.2d at 423.
Record at 15, State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421.
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When testimony is admitted over the objection of one
party who later cross-examines the witness on the matter subject to the objection, without asking leave of the court to save
the objection, the South Carolina Supreme Court holds that the
objection has been waived. 7 The court justifies this rule with
the statement that ". . if any error had been committed in
the admission of the testimony, it had been cured."8 Of course,
if when the witness is cross-examined the attorney takes care
to preserve his objection, he will not lose it. The court never
has explained exactly how this request keeps the original error
from being cured, much less why the absence of this request
automatically cures the error. Where the court first discovered this rule is unknown. Indeed, as early as 1900 in Horres
v. Berkley Chemical Co.,9 and again in 1926 in Green v.
Shaw,' ° the South Carolina court had adopted a position which
seems exactly the reverse of the current one. After examining
the earlier South Carolina cases, not including Horres, and
determining that they were not in point, the court in Green
reasoned:
The appellant having done all in his power, by proper and timely
objection, to exclude the objectionable testimony, elicited on crossexamination of the same witness a repetition of the same testimony
that had been given on direct examination. Without making the testimony elicited the testimony of the cross-examining party, cross-examination may serve a number of useful purposes in the trial of a case,
such as, for instance, testing the credibility of the witness or combatting the effect of the testimony upon the minds of the jury. And
we are unable to see why a litigant who has duly objected to the admission of incompetent testimony should be required to choose between
foregoing the opportunity to accomplish such legitimate purposes
through cross-examination of the testifying witness and waiving his

right of appeal based on the court's error in admitting the testimony. 1 '

7. State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972), State v. Anderson, 252 S.C. 650, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969), State v. Motley, 251 S.C. 268, 164
S.E.2d 569 (1968), State v. Jenkins, 249 S.C. 570, 155 S.E.2d 624 (1967), State
v. Smith, 245 S.C. 59, 138 S.E.2d 705 (1964), State v. Young, 243 S.C. 193,
133 S.E.2d 210 (1963), State v. Bass, 242 S.C. 193, 130 S.E.2d 481 (1963),
State v. Puckett, 237 S.C. 369, 117 S.E.2d 369 (1960), State v. Cavers, 236
S.C. 305, 114 S.E.2d 401 (1960).
8. State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. at 471, 186 S.E.2d at 426.
9. 57 S.C. 189, 35 S.E, 500 (1900).
10. 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226 (1926).
11. Id. a0 64-65, 134 S.E. at 228.
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The court noted that this holding was not in conflict either
12
with earlier South Carolina cases or with the majority rule.
There was no procedural condition stated by the court in
Green as a requirement for preservation of an original objection. Nor does it appear that the attorney for the aggrieved
party in Green had requested the court to save his objection
during cross-examination. Furthermore, in Green the court
quoted with approval the following:
When testimony has been admitted and an exception noted, counsel

may deem it necessary to cross examine the witness on the subject;
and, if it is simply a cross-examination, he ought not be deprived of
his exception, provided the record shows he does not intend thereby
to waive it, and that ought to be inferred when it is strictly cross13
exa ination.

What grounds are left for maintaining that the court really
meant that if an attorney uttered a bye your leave his objection would not be waived? Neither Green nor Horres has been
explicitly overruled, probably as a result of the failure of
counsel to notify the court of its precedent. This, however,
does not explain why the court never gave any reasons for
the rule applied in Hoffman.
2.

Right of Prosecution to Allege Without Possibility of
Rebuttal Other Offenses by Defendant

State v. Hoffman'4 also stands for the proposition
that where evidence of other offenses by the defendant
has been erroneously admitted, the defendant may not rebut
that evidence by proof of his acquittal of those charges. After
the testimony by Officer Haynes that the defendant and
others had been driving too fast and making excessive noise,
defense counsel attempted to place before the jury evidence
of Hoffman's acquittal of those offenses. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed with the trial court
rulings barring such testimony because "[t]he State never
offered any testimony that the appellant had been charged
with any violation of the ordinances of the Town of St. Mat12. Id. at 65, 134 S.E. at 228; I WiGmoRE, EViDENcE, §18 (3rd ed. 1940) ;
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §52 (2d ed. 1972) ; SA MooRs, FmuLx PRAcTrcE 46.04

(1971).
13. 136 S.C. at 68, 134 S.E. at 229; quoting from United Ry. and Electric
Co. v. Corbin, 109 Md. 442, 455, 72 A. 606, 610 (1909) (emphasis added).
14. 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
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thews."'15 While this is true, it still seems clear that Officer
Haynes was allowed to testify about offenses. Narrowly interpreting the language of the court it could be concluded that:
When testimony about other offenses has been admitted, so
long as the political entity which makes the formal charges
is not identified, proof of acquittal may not be offered in rebuttal. That it should make any difference to the jury what
body makes the formal charges does not seem logical. Consequently it must be assumed that when evidence of other offenses is admitted it may not be rebutted by showing an
acquittal. It is this interpretation which gave rise to Justice
Bussey's dissent.1 6
South Carolina adheres to the generally accepted rule
that evidence of the commission of another crime by the ac17
cused is inadmissible with certain justifiable exceptions.
Evidence of those offenses is admissible even though the defendant was acquitted. 18 "Most courts following that rule hold
that where proof of another offense has been admitted, the
defendant is entitled to prove his acquittal.1 9 If in Hoffman
it was error to admit the testimony about other offenses that
error could have been effectively cured by admission of acquittal from the charges arising from those offenses.
B. Technical Rulings
Limitations on Cross-Examination of a Witness Ruled
Hostile on Direct
The prosecution in State v. Hoffman called as one of its
witnesses Harry Truman Burns, who was with Hoffman
when the violation occurred. During examination it became
evident that Mr. Burns had consulted with Hoffman's attorney. The court ruled that Mr. Burns was hostile to the state
and permitted the prosecution the use of leading questions.
When defense counsel later sought to use leading questions
in examining Burns, the prosecution objected and was sustained because Burns was, in effect, a witness for the de15. Id. at 472, 186 S.E2d at 426.
16. Id. at 474, 186 S.E2d at 427.
17. State v. Thompson, 230 S.C. 473, 476, 96 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1957) and
authority there cited.
18. Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1135 (1962).

19. Id.
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fense. 20 On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court first
noted that the range and extent of cross-examination is within
the discretion of the trial judge. 21 The court then held that
since leading questions are permitted on cross-examination
because of the presumed hostility of the witness, when it
appears that the witness is in fact sympathetic with the examiner's goals, a limitation on the use of leading questions
is within the permissible discretion of the trial court. 22 This
was, apparently, a question of novel impression in South
Carolina and the rule adopted by the court is in keeping
23
with that recommended or adopted elsewhere.
I.

IMPEACHMENT

Testimony of a Witness may not be Impeached by Contradicting Statements on Collateral Matters
When Central Electric Power Co-operative sought to condemn land for an easement, an agreement was reached with
the condemnee about the location of that easement. In proceedings to fix the damages, the condemnee was questioned
about his agreement with the power company. 24 After objection by his own counsel the condemnee replied, testifying that
he had made no agreement with the company. A subsequent
witness for the power company contradicted this testimony,
again over the objection of counsel. Original plans by the
power company called for the easement to run diagonally
across the condemnee's five hundred acre tract. The agreement to route the power lines around the perimeter of the
property was apparently a concession to the condemnee. At
no time during the trial, however, did the condemnor assert
that running the lines as originally planned would have resulted in less total damage to the condemnee's property. Since
the parties stipulated that the best use of the land was for
residential subdivision, the court agreed with the condemnee
20.
21.
22.
23.

Record at 68, State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
267 S.C. at 470, 186 S.E2d at 425.
Id.
3 WIoRoE, EVDENCE §773 (Chadbourn rev; 1970). MODEL CoDE OF

EVDENCE rule 105(g)

(1942); Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United

States District Courts and Magistratesrule 6-11(c) (Preliminary Draft 1969).
See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 952 (1954).
24. Central Electric Power Co-operative, Inc. v. Brown, 258 S.C. 148, 151,
187 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1972).
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that running the lines around the perimeter of the property
actually minimized the damages. 25 Unless the power company
could prove that relocating the line effected greater damage
to the property, the agreement to relocate was immaterial to
the issue of damages. Allowing impeachment of the condem26
nee's testimony on this collateral matter was reversible error.
III. COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Agnostics and Atheists May Not Be Competent Witnesses
in South Carolina
The only question of witness competency presented to the
court for this survey period was in State v. Pitts,27 in which
a witness was challenged on the basis of his agnosticism. Since
the challenge was made incorrectly the court chose to rule on
the procedure rather than the substance of the challenge. The
court may have felt that there was no real question involved,
but since it chose not to say so some doubt remains. 28 The
basis of appellant's question lies in three cases, State v. Abercrombie,29 State v. Belton 3° and Jones v. Harris.31 Since Belton
and Abererombie dealt with the competency of youths, the
real question may have been their ability to comprehend the
nature of the sworn oath. Jones, however, had announced a
position with respect to an adult requiring as a minimum that
he believe in the existence of some power by which he would
be punished if he testified falsely.3 2 The reasoning seems
sound enough-he who does not believe that his lies will be
punished is under little pressure not to lie.3 3 Since no announcement to the contrary was made by the court in Pitts, it
may still be that agnostics and atheists would not be regarded
as competent witnesses in South Carolina.
Although it has been asserted that such a result would
be against the intent of the United States Constitution, 34 the
25. Id. at 152-153, 187 S.E.2d at 511.

26. Id. at 153, 187 S.E.2d at 511.
27. 256 S.C. 420, 182 S.E.2d 738 (1971).
28. Note, The Requirement of a Religious Belief for Competency of a
Witness, 11 S.C.L.Q. 548 (1959).
29. 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1925).

30. 24 S.C. 185 (1885).
31. 1 Strob. 160 (S.C. 1846).
32. Id. at 163.
33. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1816 (3rd ed. 1940).
34. J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH
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question has not been ruled on by the Supreme Court. Furthermore the Court's rulings on the interrelationships of "religion" and the state do not necessarily imply that a state
could not require of its witnesses what the Jones case says
South Carolina does require. Gillette v. U.S. 35 and U.S. v.
Seeger36 uphold the validity of the conscientious objector's
laws which require the demonstration of a, belief for qualification of objector status. In Seeger the Court gave the following "test":
[D]oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the
objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption?3 7

The state, then, may require some ordered belief for certain
purposes. In Gillette the Court attempted to explain how this
could be done without violating the establishment clause of
the first amendment.
[T]he Establishment Clause stands at least for the proposition that
when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must
be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary
38
impact.

Whether in this context the administration of an oath requiring a belief in some set of principles that should insure veracity in the oath giving witness is a valid secular purpose
is a question which can be argued, regardless of the merit of
the argument. Even if the South Carolina court in Pitts had
no intention of implying that agnostics and atheists were not
competent witnesses, having said nothing, it has left open a
ground for appeal on this issue.
IV.

RELEVANCY

Materiality but One Element of Relevancy
CarolinaPower and Light Co. v. Copeland 9 illuminates
the proposition that not all material evidence is relevant. In
seeking a determination of land values for awarding damages
in condemnation proceedings any legal use of the land is
material. A brief hypothetical illustrates this:
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

401 U.S. 437 (1971).
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 184.
401 U.S. at 450.
258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E2d 188 (1972).
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Askew, the owner of an undeveloped 400 acre tract of land, decided to
sell. He advertised his land as suitable for commercial or residential
purposes. Askew received offers from a residential developer, a specialist in industrial properties, an eccentric Nimrod, and a pulpwood company. Since their offer exceeded all others by at least $4,000, Askew
sold his property to the pulpwood company.

Any one of the offers would have been material in attempting
to prove the value of the land for the use to which the offeror
would have put it. The highest and best use must have been
for growing trees, however, for that is the use which elicited
the highest offer.
The condemnee should be awarded damages equal to 1)
the value of the land actually taken based upon its value for
its best use, plus 2) any special damages caused by the presence of the thing for which land was condemned. 40 In order
to prove his damages the condemnee must first answer these
two questions: 1) What use is to be asserted as a basis for
valuation? 2) What is the value of this land for that use?
Like Askew in the hypothetical, the landowner may assert
any use as a resolution of his first question. The answer to
the second question is where most problems arise in land
condemnation cases. In Copeland the court said:
A landowner is entitled to just compensation for the property taken
as of the date of condemnation. Obviously, the potential which a parcel
of land has for bringing about profits from skillful use and businesslike development is one of the factors which determines market value.
Accordingly, it is always appropriate for witnesses to testify
concern41
ing the potential highest and best use of property taken.

Too often, a landowner will attempt to prove, as did
Copeland, the value for his land as if it were already developed for the asserted use. Valuation for undeveloped land,
however, must be based on what someone would pay to buy
that land for the asserted use. 42 Copeland's witnesses having
asserted that his undeveloped property was best suited for
use as a rural residential community, then testified as to
damages based on a per lot price in the non-existing community. 43 This testimony did not serve to prove the actual
damages to the property in its then existing state.
40. Id. at 217, 188 S.E2d at 193.
41. Id. at 214-215, 188 S.E.2d at 192.
42. Id. at 216, 188 S.E2d at 192, citing 27 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain
§280 (1966).
43. 258 S.C. at 216, 188 S.E.2d at 193.
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567

Evidence is that by which a stated or unstated proposition is either proved or given support as a viable proposition.
In order to meet the first half of a two part test for relevancy,
the proposition sought to be furthered or supported by the
evidence to be offered must be material to something in issue
between the opponents. The second part of the test is whether
44
indeed the evidence does advance or support the proposition.
Applying the test to the instant case, it can be posited that
Copeland had a material proposition available: The property
is best suited for use as rural homesites and for such use a
developer of rural homesites would pay x dollars per acre.
As has been noted, however, Copeland's witnesses testified
to the value of the land on a per lot basis. The proposition
which that testimony would have supported is as follows:
The land has been developed to the point that it may now be
sold in lots to rural homebuilders, and as such a rural homebuilder would pay x dollars per lot. Since the land was not
so developed this proposition could not have been material
to anything at issue between the parties and testimony so admitted was consequently irrelevant. From the size of the verdict rendered it was obvious that the jury used Copeland's
erroneously admitted irrelevant testimony in arriving at his
damages. The court therefore granted the appellant power
45
company a new trial.
V.

WRITINGS

Parol Evidence
In Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis46 the defendant in a claim
and delivery action alleged fraud in the making of the contract. Judgment was for the defendant after testimony about
the making of the contract was allowed over plaintiff's objections. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment reiterating its holding that parol evidence is ad47
missible to show fraud at the inception of a contract.

VI.

HEARSAY

In Marsh Plywood Corp. v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.,48 the court ruled that the erroneous admission of
44.
45.
46.
47.

McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE §185 (2nd ed. 1972).
258 S.C. at 218, 188 S.E.2d at 193.
257 S.C. 266, 185 S.E.2d 739 (1971).
Id. at 273, 185 S.E.2d at 742.

48. 258 S.C. 119, 187 S.E2d 515 (1972).
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hearsay did not constitute prejudice so great as to require a
new trial when the subject of the hearsay was substantiated
by the party claiming error. Plaintiff suffered damages from
highway construction which interfered with his contractual
right to the removal of timber from land within a specified
time. To establish damages, plaintiff's witness testified on
the basis of reports made by a forester at the time the contract was entered. The defendant produced an expert, another
forester, who made estimates on the basis of his observations.
These estimates of damages were remarkably similar to those
given in the hearsay testimony. Since the appellant could show
no prejudice resulting from the testimony there was not justi49
fication for a new trial.
BRENTON DEWITT JEFFCOAT

49. Id. at 124, 187 S.E.2d at 517.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss4/8

10

